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The introduction of a common internal market has been at the top of the European Union’s 
agenda. A functioning market should foster competition and reduce trade barriers. Energy, and 
in particular electricity, is among the key sectors targeted by efforts to integrate market areas 
and, as a consequence, promote competitive prices, enhance efficiency, achieve higher 
standards of service, and secure supply and sustainability (Directive 2009/72/EC). “A well-
integrated internal energy market is a fundamental pre-requisite to achieve these objectives in 
a cost-effective way.” (European Commission, 2014, p. 2). The integration of electricity 
markets requires substantial investments to remove transmission bottlenecks and to enhance 
interconnector capacity. Moreover, market coupling1 is necessary to allocate cross-border 
capacities efficiently. 
Economic theory suggests that, like with any other good, electricity trade is welfare enhancing 
compared to autarkic supply, since it enhances the markets’ allocative efficiency. Besides, 
electricity is a homogenous good.2 If traded freely and unconstrained, the law of one price must 
hold, so that spot prices between two markets become equalized. However, electricity markets 
were initially designed to meet their national demands, and, hence, complications arise when 
trying to interconnect market areas among each other. Interconnection capacities are frequently 
exhausted (apart from domestic transmission bottlenecks) and, thus, place obstacles for free 
trade. As a result, spot prices diverge during times of cross-border congestion. 
Interconnection capacity limitations are not the sole reason for deviations from uniform spot 
prices. “Market design imperfections”, such as differences in auction design, pricing rules, or 
closing hours between power exchanges of adjacent market areas may hinder price convergence 
(Nitsche et al., 2010). This is why market coupling, in addition to the extension of 
interconnection capacity, is an important tool for fostering market integration. Currently, flow 
based market coupling ensures that not only the market designs become synchronized, but also 
that power and capacity are traded simultaneously, so that electricity markets fully utilize the 
available interconnection capacities (Keppler et al., 2014). 
Politically, electricity market integration is a relevant topic, which bears some controversy. In 
general, market integration is desirable because it entails enhanced balancing of supply and 
demand shocks, better integration of intermittent renewables, security of supply, reduced price 
1 As argued in more detail below, market coupling entails simultaneous auctioning of available transfer capacity 
and electricity. Hence, it promotes efficient allocation of interconnector capacity. 
2 At least what concerns physical properties. Electricity is, of course, differentiated regarding its production 
technology (conventional vs renewable production), location and time of day. 
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variance (i.e. less risk), lower prices (for consumers) on average and increased total welfare 
(as well as consumer surplus) due to increased allocative efficiency (see, e.g. Nepal and Jamasb, 
2012; Vattenfall, 2015). Yet, market integration does not bring about increased consumer 
surplus for everyone. While electricity trade causes a decline in the initially high-price market, 
the price in the low-price market rises.3 As a consequence, not everyone benefits from price 
convergence. Both consumers in the low-price market and producers in the high-price market 
experience losses in their economic rents. These potentially negative effects may render the 
practical implementation of an integration policy across Europe cumbersome. 
Against this background, this paper seeks to analyze the current state of integration among 
European wholesale electricity markets by analyzing price convergence of day-ahead spot 
markets. We illustrate the social welfare effects of market integration and provide reasoning 
that price convergence may be desirable from a welfare perspective but politically cumbersome 
to realize, because the transition brings about winners and losers. 
Key for our empirical analysis is the rich and novel dataset on hourly day-ahead spot prices 
from 25 European electricity market areas for the period 01.01.2010–30.06.2015. We combine 
these data with a large set of control variables. A particular feature of the data is the ability to 
explicitly address hourly interconnection capacity congestion and its direction. Moreover, we 
are able to assess the effects of market coupling on market integration. 
The empirical approach follows a two-step procedure. First, we apply cointegration analysis to 
draw conclusions about the long-run price relations of adjacent and indirect market pairs. 
Second, we focus on error correction to infer about markets’ speeds of adjustment after price 
shocks, from which we may come to a judgement about markets’ efficiency to deal with new 
information. This paper puts price convergence to empirical scrutiny that goes beyond 
econometric modelling of the existing literature: (1) We argue that error correction models can 
only be applied during times of trade frictions so that shocks resulting in differential prices can 
be observed); (2) We stress that, for the sake of comparability across market pairs, the error 
correction model should be constrained to a perfect long-run price relation in order to assess 
the speed of adjustment back to uniform prices. (3) We evaluate integration and market 
efficiency both for daily averages, which provides a general overview, and at the hourly 
frequency, which allows for including a one-hour lag to account for intra-day demand and 
3 Under the assumption of an increasing supply curve (i.e. marginal cost schedule). This Assumption is fulfilled in 
the electricity sector given its increasing merit order curve. 
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supply rigidities. Other studies focusing on daily averages are not able to control for such intra-
day patterns. 
Our results indicate that market integration increased from 2010 to mid of 2012 but then 
declined until 2015, foremost due to the increased production from intermittent renewables. We 
argue that for the counterfactual scenario of missing efforts to integrate markets, 
interconnection congestion and more extreme price effects (of peaking positive and negative 
prices) are likely to increase. Furthermore, we reach the conclusion that the efficiency of 
integration is rather modest, as the average speed of adjustment from price shocks is quite 
limited. Although investments are costly and generally sunk, this gives rise for a large potential 
for welfare improvements from additional capacity investments and further promotion of 
market coupling among European electricity markets, given their modest levels of integration 
and limited efficiencies (i.e. speeds of adjustment). Since European markets undergo significant 
structural changes, such as increased promotion of intermittent renewables, nuclear phase-out, 
and low investment incentives from falling spot prices, the benefits of market integration – 
particularly balancing and supply security – become especially pronounced 
2. Literature 
In this section, we first summarize findings from the relevant empirical literature on electricity 
market integration, which has mainly focused on price correlations. Second, we discuss studies 
on the potential effects of market integration. 
De Vany and Walls (1999) evaluate cointegration of price pairs during daily peak and off-peak 
periods of 11 western US power markets from 1994 to 1996. They conclude that these markets 
are already well integrated, especially during times of off-peak demand. Zachmann (2008) 
evaluates price convergence based on filtered price relations, principal component analysis and 
unit root tests for 11 European markets for the hourly period 2002–2006. His results indicate 
that despite decreasing price differentials over time (due to better cross-border 
interconnections), markets were still far from full integration. Nepal and Jamasb (2012) show, 
based on the Kalman filter method, that the Irish Single Market was hardly integrated with other 
European markets during 2008–2011. 
Keppler et al. (2014) investigate the effects of increased renewable supply and market coupling 
on hourly price differences between France and Germany from November 2009 to June 2013. 
Their results indicate that increased supply from intermittent renewables often leads to 
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interconnection congestion and hence to price divergence, while market coupling strengthens 
price convergence. This gives rise to the importance of investments in interconnection 
capacities and market coupling during times of subsidized and prioritized feed-in for 
intermittent renewables. 
Jacottet (2012) highlights that market integration and consequently price convergence leads to 
an overall gain in welfare, which explains the efforts of the European Commission to promote 
investment in interconnection capacities. Despite the general positive welfare aspect, additional 
interconnections bring about welfare redistribution and cause consumers from markets with 
initially low (high) price levels to lose in surplus, whilst consumers (producers) from high (low) 
price areas benefit. Consequently, Member States that expect prices to rise from increased trade 
disapprove with EC’s efforts to foster integration. Keppler et al. (2014, p. 4) support this 
argument: “With unconstrained interconnections, consumers in the higher price zone would 
gain more in terms of consumer surplus than what other consumers in the lower price zone 
would lose.” 
Böckers et al. (2013) emphasize that market integration may significantly reduce the 
possibilities for electricity firms to exercise market power (e.g. strategic withholding of 
generation capacity). Dominant firms operating in concentrated national markets may face a 
severe increase in competition from market integration resulting in a more efficient market with 
competitive prices. 
Some studies argue that market integration bears potential benefits that go beyond welfare 
enhancement and reducion of market power. Interconnected markets generate supply security, 
reduce the need for considerable reserve capacity, increase markets’ liquidities and lower the 
operating costs of the system (Zachmann, 2008; Nepal and Jamasb, 2012). Besides, 
interconnections lower price volatility (e.g. from intermittent renewable production) and thus 
provide better investment incentives through the mitigation of uncertainty (Nepal and Jamasb, 
2012).4
3. Market Integration and Spot Price Convergence 
Given our empirical analysis on the current state and the efficiency of electricity market 
integration, in this section we discuss how the integration process affects prices and 
4 Yet, Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) argue that investment incentives may even rise under increased market 
uncertainty if there is a long time-to-build lag. 
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redistributes welfare. As is shown below, prices between two markets may converge partially 
(they approximate each other) or fully (law of one price holds), depending on the degree of 
market integration. 
Market integration necessitates investment in interconnection capacity (assuming no 
bottlenecks in the transmission grid) as a prerequisite for potential electricity exchange between 
adjacent market areas. As long as interconnection capacity is not exhausted, electricity may 
flow from the low price area to the high price area, causing prices to converge. Still, price 
convergence not only hinges upon the existence of interconnection capacity but also on capacity 
allocation mechanism. Without market coupling, electricity and interconnection capacity are 
traded separately allowing for coordination failures and strategic withholding of 
interconnection capacities. Hence, misallocation of available capacity may hinder price 
convergence. For that reason, market coupling imposes implicit auctioning of interconnector 
capacity, so that electricity and transfer capacity are auctioned simultaneously.  
Figure 1 shows how electricity trade between two initially autarkic market areas may help 
improving supply efficiency. Electricity supply follows a merit order of generation 
technologies’ marginal costs. In the flat beginning of the supply curve, renewables (e.g. wind 
and solar) and hydro (run of river) plants are located with marginal costs close to zero, followed 
by nuclear plants and various types of coal. Gas, pump-storage and oil encompass peak-load 
technologies with relatively high operating costs located in the steep parts of the supply curve. 
Both markets A and B are equal in terms of national demand. However, while market A is able 
to meet its national demand relatively cheaply, market B’s supply curve is relatively steep and 
utilizes a great share of power plants with high marginal costs (e.g. gas). In the case of autarky 
(Scenario 1), no exchange takes place due to missing interconnection capacity. As a result, the 
price of market A (PA,Autarky) lies much lower than the price of market B (PB,Autarky). 
In Scenario 2 we assume that there is limited interconnection capacity (and market coupling) 
allowing for some trade resulting in partial price convergence: Market A with the initially much 
lower price exports its electricity to market B, which shifts its demand curve (DA) to the right 
(additional demand from market B), until the available capacity is exhausted. Thus, PA,Autarky
rises to PA,CapLim. Market B imports electricity from market A (until the interconnection capacity 
is exhausted), which shifts its supply curve to the right (additional supply from market A). As 
market B produces in the steep part of the supply curve, some trade already brings about a large 
price decline from PB,Autarky to PB,CapLim. We can observe that limited trade not only brings about 
a welfare gain (areas B+D) but also a welfare redistribution: In market A consumers lose a little 
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(-A) while producers gain a little (A+B), whereas in market B consumers gain substantially 
(C+D) while producers lose substantially (-C). 
Full market integration is depicted in scenario 3, where abundant transfer capacity paralleled 
by market coupling lead to uniform prices from uncongested trade. Market A exports to market 
B without constraints until prices fully converge to PNoCong. The two formerly separate markets 
become one uniform electricity market. In market A, producers gain a little on the back of 
consumers (A+E) and from the newly created welfare (B+F). In market B, consumers are 
confronted with a substantial gain on the back of producers (C+G) and from the newly created 
welfare (D+H). Evidently, full market integration maximizes social welfare due to allocative 
efficiency. In total, the price drop in market B outweighs the price increase in market A. Hence, 
full integration is a desirable market outcome from a welfare perspective. However, welfare 
redistribution may place a political obstacle on integration efforts, such as investments in 
additional interconnection capacity and/or the promotion of market coupling. 
8 
Figure 1: Market integration and price convergence 
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4. Methodology 
To provide the basis for policy implications, this study seeks to empirically evaluate the 
efficiency of electricity market integration in Europe. The analysis is based on a two-step 
approach. Firstly, we investigate the long-run price relationships between both adjacent and 
indirect (no common border) market pairs based on cointegration analysis. From this we infer 
about the current state of market integration in Europe. Secondly, we apply an error correction 
model, which allows to make statements about the speed of adjustment from price shocks. This 
provides an indication of how efficiently markets deal with new information. 
4.1. Cointegration 
We evaluate the long-run relationship between two (non-stationary) hourly spot price series, 
, and ,, where the subscripts A and B denote two distinct markets and t indicates the time. 
We estimate the following linear combination:  
, =  + , +   (1) 
and take the residuals: 
̂ = ,    ̂,  (2) 
If the two price series are integrated of order one (, & , ~ (1))5 and the errors are 
integrated of order zero (̂ ∼ (0))6, they have a long-rung equilibrium relation, so that they 
cannot move away from each other for long. Random shocks (in ,) can only cause deviations 
for a short time period, after which the price series converge back to their long-run equilibrium.  
While the intercept  indicates institutional price differences, between the two markets, the 
trend coefficient  measures how closely the two price series move along. A  coefficient of 
one indicates a perfect co-movement between , and ,. In contrast, if  ≠ 0 and  ≠ 1, 
prices diverge (e.g. due to interconnection congestion and/or absence of market coupling). 
Equation (1) may be extended by cross-border congestion () and its interaction term with 
the price in market B (,).  is a binary indicator, which equals one during hours of 
congested interconnection capacity between markets A and B. To address the direction of 
5 There is strong indication that many price series are non-stationary (or at least exhibit non-stationary properties) 
using KPSS and Adjusted Dickey-Fuller tests (see also Fezzi and Bunn, 2010). Moreover, integration of order one 
holds throughout. Results are available upon request. 
6 KPSS and Adjusted Dickey-Fuller tests indicate that the errors are integrated of order zero throughout. 
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congestion, we may separate  into congested hours from market A to B (,) and 
from market B to A (,). Hence, we expand Equation (1) accordingly, to show that 
alternating directions of congestion have different impacts on the degree of integration: 
, =  + , + , + ,, + , + ,, +  (3) 
From Equation (3) the cointegration coefficient  tells us how well markets’ prices would move 
together under the hypothetical scenario of uncongested interconnectors. Under this condition, 
we would assume extensive electricity trade between the market pairs leading to a close price 
relation, and  coming closer to unity than without controlling for cross-border congestion. Yet, 
the absence of market coupling tends to cause capacity misallocation so that markets are still 
imperfectly integrated. We, thus, estimate Equation (3) for periods without market coupling 
(, = 0) and for periods where market coupling is in place (, = 1): 
, =  + , + , + ,, + , + ,, +
 � , = 1 , = 0 (4) 
This accords with an empirical test that shows that with market coupling (, = 1) and 
uncongested interconnection (, = 0, , = 0), perfect market integration (i.e.  =1,  = 0) must apply. In other words, we empirically show that no other determinants than 
market coupling and uncongested interconnection capacity cause price convergence. 
4.2. Error Correction Model 
From the estimation of an error correction model, we may assess how efficiently two markets 
are able to absorb random shocks through trade: 
∆, =  + ,−24 + ̂−24 + ′ + ,  (5) 
where Δ measures a first difference (e.g. Δ =   −24). The coefficient of the lagged error 
correction term () measures the speed of adjustment of a shock that causes the two prices series 
(, and ,) to deviate from their long-run equilibrium relation in the previous day back to 
their steady-state. Hence,  leads to inference about the efficiency of the markets: “the higher 
the speed of price adjustment […] the more efficiently information can be converted into price 
signals” (Growitsch et al., 2013, p. 94). In other words,  measures the “feedback effect” of a 
disequilibrium in the previous period on the current price , (Asteriou and Hall, 2011, p. 359). 
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The autoregressive term ,−24 may capture typical patterns of demand persistency (e.g. peak 
and base load demand) and supply persistency (rigidity versus flexibility of peak or base-load 
power plants, e.g. due to fixed costs of run-ups) 24 hours earlier.7 The vector  includes control 
variables that may influence demand or supply (e.g. wind and solar forecasts, dummy for 
market coupling, gas prices, seasonal fixed effects, national holidays; see also Fezzi and Bunn, 
2010). 
The application of an error correction model is somewhat tricky with respect to electricity spot 
prices, which has not yet been debated in the literature, as far as we know. During times of 
uncongested trade flows (i.e. when interconnection capacity is abundant and market coupling 
is in place), the law of one price holds and, thus, shocks to the system are absorbed 
instantaneously. As a result, shocks resulting in differential prices cannot be observed, which 
renders the estimation of an error correction model impossible.  
Against this backdrop, we estimate the error correction model only when differential price 
shocks can be measured (i.e. during times of trade frictions). We, thus, restrict the estimation 
of the error correction model to times of unequal prices in t-24 (,24 ≠ ,24), when we 
observe the shock (̂−24), so that error correction must not be instantaneous. This kind of 
analysis allows for inference of how effectively market areas deal with shocks during times of 
trade frictions. On the other hand, during times of uncongested trade, markets work perfectly 
efficient by definition. Hence, we introduce a binary indicator for a price difference, , =1  , ≠ , and , = 0  , = ,, and impose the constraint on Equation (5) 
accordingly: 
∆, =  + ,−24 + ̂−24 +  +   ,−24 = 1,  (6) 
Besides, we posit that the error correction model should be constrained to a perfect long-run 
cointegrating relation, which not only allows for assessment about the speed of adjustment to 
uniform prices, but also to be able to compare the efficiency of integration across market pairs. 
At the hourly frequency8, we are able to include a one-hour lag in our model, which accounts 
for intra-day demand and supply rigidities. As we will argue below, this bears an important 
feature of this study, since other empirical studies focusing on daily averages are not able to 
control for such intra-day patterns. 
7 Subsequently, we extend the model by a one hour lag (t-1), that may capture intra-day supply and demand 
rigidities: ∆, =  + ,−1 + ,−24 + ̂−24 + ′ + . For example, it takes time to ramp (nuclear or 
conventional) power plants, so that it may not be possible to adjust their supply in each hour. On the other hand, 
changes in demand may be rigid over several hours over the day. 
8 We also run regressions for each hour of the day. 
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Additionally, we argue that it may be misleading to compare the speeds of adjustment () back 
to the long-rung equilibria (i.e.  coefficients estimated in the first stage), since these differ 
across market pairs.9 Hence, we restrict error correction to a perfect equilibrium price relation 
(i.e.  = 0,  = 1):10
∆, =  + ,−24 + ,−24  ,−24 +  +   ,−24 = 1.  (7) 
In this restricted form, the error correction term  measures how long it takes to absorb a 
systemic shock back to uniform prices (i.e. , = ,), which allows for direct comparison 
across market pairs.  
5. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Compared to the existing literature on electricity market integration, our novel and rich dataset 
is a key asset. We collected information on hourly day-ahead spot price series from 25 European 
electricity markets for the period 01.01.2010–30.06.2015. The following markets are included: 
the Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark East (DKe), Denmark West (DKw), Estonia (EST), Finland 
(FIN), France (FR), Germany-Austria (DE; one pricing zone)11, Hungary (HU), Italy North 
(IT), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Norway – Oslo, Kr.Sa, Molde, Tromso, Bergen (NO1–5), 
Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SL), Spain (ES), Switzerland (CH), and Sweden 1–4 
(SE1–4). Data emanate from the respective power exchanges for the period: EPEX, SouthPool, 
GME, NordPool, OMIP, OTE and HUPX. 
In order to construct a measure for cross-border congestion (CBC), we calculate free transfer 
capacities (FTC) as the difference between the available transfer capacity (ATC) and already 
allocated capacity (AAC):  =   . Hourly data for ATC and AAC are obtained 
from CASC (Capacity Allocation Service Company), CAO (Central Allocation Office) and 
Energinet.dk. If free capacity is available ( > 0), interconnection capacity is not exhausted, 
while no free capacity ( = 0) indicates congestion. Hence, the binary indicator CBC takes 
the value of one if cross border capacity is congested and zero otherwise. Besides, we have 
ATC and AAC for both directions, from market A to market B ( & ) and for the 
9 It may be the case, that two price series are not well integrated ( strongly deviates from one), but their speed 
of adjustment may be high ( close to minus one). This would suggest that price shocks can be absorbed very 
fast, but only back to a very loose long-run equilibrium relation. On the other hand, another market pair may 
have a high price correlation but a slow speed of adjustment. This makes comparison cumbersome. 
10 With uniform prices, −24 = ,−24  ,−24. See Growitsch and Nepal, 2009, for a similar approach in gas 
markets 
11 We refer to the German-Austrian pricing zone as Germany. 
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reverse direction ( & ). This allows decomposing our indicator for cross border 
capacity congestion for both directions ( & ). 
Hourly day-ahead forecasts for wind and solar production are only available for Germany, 
Austria and Denmark for the full sample period 2010–2015Q2 and for Italy from 2013–2015. 
Given their limited availability, we use these data for robustness estimation of the respective 
subsamples. It turns out that the exclusion of wind and solar production forecasts does not alter 
the respective estimated coefficients of the error correction terms12, which indicates that the 
omission of such data may be of minor importance for this paper’s objective to assess the 
efficiency of market integration. 
Data on national holidays are provided by www.feiertagskalender.ch and included together with 
seasonal (daily and monthly) fixed effects as demand shifters (see e.g. Escribano et al., 2011). 
Market coupling () is a binary indicator, which takes the value of one after the introduction 
of market coupling between two markets A and B. The daily spot price of gas (EUR/MWh; 
which is highly correlated with the oil price) is obtained from BAFA (German Federal Office 
for Economic Affairs and Export Control) controls for costs of conventional technologies. 
After the European liberalization process of the respective national electricity markets, 
wholesale electricity markets were established subsequently. These power exchanges represent 
a fundamental pillar toward the implementation of one single European electricity market. 
Alternatively, trade may happen through OTC markets or bilateral contracting. Table 1 provides 
information on the liquidity (i.e. hare of traded volumes in total national load) of selected power 
exchanges, for which proper data were available. Table 1 reveals that the liquidities of power 
exchanges have been growing over time (for the exception of OMIP where the liquidity was 
initially high already), pointing to an increasing importance of electricity spot markets. 
Table 1. Liquidity of selected power exchanges
Volumes Traded (GWh) National Load (GWh) Share (%)
Country Exchange 2010 2014 2010 2014 2010 2014
DE/AT EPEX 205,000 285,000 547,000 625,000 37% 46%
FR EPEX 52,600 73,100 512,000 514,000 10% 14%
CH EPEX 9,325 22,000 58,500 51,400 16% 43%
SL SP 179 6,806 7,086 14,100 3% 48%
ESP OMIP 196,000 187,000 260,000 265,000 75% 71%
12 See Section 6.2. 
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Table 2. Yearly day-ahead electricity spot prices
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015Q1,2 2010–2015Q2
CH 51.02 56.18 49.52 44.73 36.79 38.71 46.84
CZ 43.70 50.56 42.38 36.74 32.96 30.25 40.28
DE/AT 44.49 51.13 43.01 37.81 32.76 30.21 40.79
DKE 54.53 49.42 37.54 39.61 32.15 26.46 41.18
DKW 46.49 47.96 36.34 37.90 30.67 24.65 38.50
ES 37.01 49.92 47.23 44.26 42.13 47.12 44.38
EST 44.68 43.35 39.20 43.14 37.61 31.26 40.47
FIN 54.59 49.31 36.53 41.16 36.02 28.94 42.20
FR 47.50 48.89 46.11 43.38 34.63 38.74 43.62
HU 46.44 55.13 51.55 42.34 40.50 36.06 46.16
IT 62.47 71.16 73.87 61.05 49.58 48.73 62.29
LT NA NA 45.50 48.93 50.13 37.82 46.90
LV NA NA NA 52.41 50.12 37.69 47.79
NO1 54.25 46.42 29.56 37.57 27.33 23.63 37.63
NO2 50.82 46.09 29.16 37.34 27.23 23.58 36.81
NO3 56.06 47.50 31.46 38.96 31.54 24.67 39.60
NO3 55.41 47.48 31.15 38.60 31.44 24.22 39.31
NO5 51.80 45.86 28.95 37.60 27.14 23.57 36.94
PT 37.32 50.45 48.07 43.64 41.86 47.21 44.54
SE1 NA 47.70 31.70 39.19 31.42 24.26 39.46
SE2 NA 47.70 31.76 39.19 31.42 24.26 39.47
SE3 54.9 47.85 32.30 39.45 31.62 24.81 39.73
SE4 NA 48.48 34.18 39.93 31.92 26.16 40.45
SK NA 50.90 42.84 37.20 33.64 30.89 40.02
SL 47.77 57.20 53.15 43.17 40.43 36.59 47.25
Average 50.47 48.07 38.41 39.80 34.41 30.41 40.26
Note: NA indicates missing data.
In Table 2 we report yearly spot prices for all 25 market areas. On average, prices have declined 
over the period 2010–2015Q2. This negative price trend is related to an enormous investment 
in subsidized renewables (foremost wind and solar13), headed by Germany, which is well 
interconnected among its neighbors. The nuclear phase out in Germany (see Grossi et al., 2014) 
and the halt in investment in nuclear power in other European countries in the aftermath of the 
Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear accident in March 2011 may have counteracted an even further drop 
in European spot prices. Moreover, developments of gas and oil prices may have an influence 
on electricity spot prices. Over the period 2010–2015, Italian consumers have faced the highest 
spot price, which may be explained by the fact that Italy is largely disconnected from other 
European markets14 and generates electricity at relatively high marginal costs. In contrast, the 
Nordic consumers are confronted with relatively low prices on average, given their 
predominance of hydro generation. 
13 In Europe solar and wind capacities increased from 31GW and 86GW in 2010 to 88GW and 135GW in 2014, 
respectively (BP, 2015). 
14 According to our data, the few Italian interconnectors are congested almost 100% of the time over the sample 
period. 
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Table 3. Direction of congested hours: DE and selected neighbors
Direction Market Coupling 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015Q1,2
DE → HU
Not introduced 
NA 94% 100% 99% 100% 100%
HU → DE NA 97% 99% 99% 99% 99%
Total NA 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
DE → FR
Since Nov. 9, 2010 
90% 11% 30% 42% 32% 67%
FR → DE 85% 27% 7% 12% 17% 7%
Total 92% 38% 37% 53% 49% 73%
Note: NA indicates missing data.
Table 3 stylistically explains how market coupling is indeed successful in reducing cross-border 
congestion through efficient capacity allocation by two selected market pairs: Germany–
Hungary have not yet implemented market coupling; Germany–France have introduced market 
coupling in the end of 2010. The table shows the share of hours with congested interconnectors 
and the direction of congestion. Without market coupling, interconnector capacity is congested 
throughout – and thus, allocated inefficiently – as Germany–Hungary shows. Indeed, we see 
that available capacities are almost entirely congested in both directions at the same time.   
Similarly, for Germany–France in 2010, before the introduction of market coupling, 
interconnection capacities were frequently exhausted (92% in total) in both directions. Upon 
the introduction of market coupling, congestion was limited to 38% in 2011. Additionally, we 
see that with market coupling, capacity can only be allocated in one direction exclusively. 
Evidently, simultaneous auctioning of capacity and electricity leads to an efficient allocation of 
available capacity.15 After 2011, congestion between Germany and France increased again, 
which may be explained by the rising share of subsidized and prioritized generation from 
intermittent renewables, which frequently lead to excess supply in Germany, which is then 
exported to neighboring markets (e.g. France). 
6. Results 
In the following, we show regression estimates based on our empirical methodology as 
presented in section 4. Given that our large dataset of 25 price series for the hourly period 2010–
2015Q2 yields a number of 625 market pairs (adjacent and indirect pairs in both directions), it 
may be difficult to present tables containing complete estimation results. For this purpose, we 
either present summary tables of selected results for a complete set of all sample markets, or 
15 For more information relating to the benefits of market coupling see Booz & Co, et al. (2013). 
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tables of selected markets (foremost Germany and selected neighboring markets) including a 
richer detail of information. 
6.1. First Stage: Degree of Market Integration 
This section presents regression results from the cointegration model as introduced in Equation 
(1). If two price series have a strong co-movement in equilibrium, their estimated -coefficient 
must be close to one. Table 4 presents the deviations16 of the -coefficients from perfect market 
integration ( = 1) for both adjacent and indirect market pairs estimated at the hourly 
frequency by year. Since some price data are not available for the early years in our sample, the 
number of included market pairs increases over time.  
Table 4. 1st stage results, deviation from full integration ( = )
Adjacent market pairs
Year Pairs Dev. +/-0.10 Dev. +/-0.20 Dev. +/-0.30 Dev. +/-0.40 Dev. +/-0.50
2010 60 32% 45% 53% 70% 78%
2011 72 47% 63% 74% 79% 89%
2012 72 42% 60% 72% 85% 88%
2013 76 46% 63% 66% 76% 91%
2014 76 36% 61% 68% 74% 79%
2015Q1, 2 76 41% 61% 71% 78% 89%
Indirect market pairs
Year Pairs Dev. +/-0.10 Dev. +/-0.20 Dev. +/-0.30 Dev. +/-0.40 Dev. +/-0.50
2010 282 5% 10% 17% 25% 35%
2011 434 10% 17% 23% 30% 38%
2012 480 9% 17% 28% 38% 47%
2013 524 12% 21% 29% 35% 46%
2014 524 10% 20% 26% 35% 41%
2015Q1, 2 524 13% 22% 30% 37% 47%
Notes: “Dev. +/-“ refers to positive or negative deviations of the estimated -coefficients from unity in the 
respective magnitude. All reported numbers are statistically significant at the 99% level.
We can see that adjacent electricity markets show higher price correlations than market pairs 
with no common border, yet, indirect market pairs catch up more strongly than adjacent pairs. 
Despite an already high degree of integration at least in some markets, the European spot 
markets seem to be still far away from one single price (i.e.  = 0,  = 1). 
16 For example, “Dev. +/-0.10” indicates a deviation of plus or minus 0.10 from  = 1 (0.90 ≤  ≤ 1.10) and 
shows how many market pairs fall in this category.  
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Table 5. 1st stage results: -coefficients and time effects
All pairs (# = 600) Adjacent pairs (# = 72) Indirect pairs (# = 524)
Hour  , ∗  , ∗   , ∗  , ∗   , ∗  , ∗ 
1 0.303 *** 0.0050 *** -0.00012 *** 0.716 *** 0.0017 *** -0.00006 *** 0.244 *** 0.0054 *** -0.00013 ***
2 0.350 *** 0.0038 *** -0.00011 *** 0.744 *** 0.0012 *** -0.00005 *** 0.293 *** 0.0042 *** -0.00011 ***
3 0.388 *** 0.0025 *** -0.00009 *** 0.756 *** 0.0009 *** -0.00004 *** 0.334 *** 0.0027 * -0.00009 *
4 0.380 *** 0.0028 *** -0.00009 *** 0.750 *** 0.0014 *** -0.00005 *** 0.326 *** 0.0030 *** -0.00009 ***
5 0.330 *** 0.0046 *** -0.00010 *** 0.734 *** 0.0020 *** -0.00005 *** 0.272 *** 0.0050 *** -0.00011 ***
6 0.361 *** 0.0042 *** -0.00010 *** 0.744 *** 0.0015 *** -0.00005 *** 0.306 *** 0.0046 * -0.00010 *
7 0.427 *** 0.0035 * -0.00008 * 0.780 *** 0.0011 -0.00004 0.376 *** 0.0038 * -0.00008 *
8 0.377 *** 0.0081 ** -0.00012 * 0.816 *** 0.0011 -0.00003 0.314 *** 0.0091 ** -0.00013 *
9 0.330 *** 0.0096 * -0.00014 * 0.812 *** 0.0012 -0.00004 0.260 *** 0.0109 * -0.00015 *
10 0.340 *** 0.0081 * -0.00013 * 0.805 *** 0.0006 * -0.00003 0.272 *** 0.0092 * -0.00014 *
11 0.343 *** 0.0067 * -0.00012 * 0.797 *** 0.0003 * -0.00003 * 0.278 *** 0.0077 * -0.00014 *
12 0.346 *** 0.0058 * -0.00012 * 0.789 *** 0.0003 -0.00004 0.281 *** 0.0066 * -0.00013 *
13 0.303 *** 0.0075 * -0.00014 * 0.780 *** 0.0007 -0.00004 0.234 *** 0.0085 * -0.00015 *
14 0.366 *** 0.0058 * -0.00012 * 0.789 *** 0.0008 * -0.00004 * 0.305 *** 0.0065 * -0.00013 *
15 0.392 *** 0.0051 * -0.00011 * 0.800 *** 0.0005 -0.00004 0.333 *** 0.0057 * -0.00012 **
16 0.341 *** 0.0077 * -0.00013 ** 0.787 *** 0.0014 -0.00004 0.276 *** 0.0087 * -0.00014 **
17 0.334 *** 0.0082 * -0.00013 * 0.780 *** 0.0018 * -0.00004 0.270 *** 0.0091 ** -0.00015 *
18 0.300 *** 0.0112 * -0.00016 * 0.783 *** 0.0027 -0.00005 0.230 *** 0.0125 ** -0.00018 **
19 0.285 *** 0.0113 ** -0.00016 * 0.778 *** 0.0027 * -0.00005 * 0.213 *** 0.0126 ** -0.00018 **
20 0.322 *** 0.0086 ** -0.00015 * 0.735 *** 0.0031 -0.00006 * 0.262 *** 0.0093 ** -0.00016 *
21 0.266 *** 0.0085 ** -0.00015 ** 0.663 *** 0.0040 * -0.00008 *** 0.208 *** 0.0092 ** -0.00017 **
22 0.330 *** 0.0035 *** -0.00011 *** 0.664 *** 0.0028 *** -0.00007 *** 0.281 *** 0.0036 * -0.00011 *
23 0.426 *** -0.0008 *** -0.00008 *** 0.714 *** 0.0007 *** -0.00005 *** 0.385 *** -0.0010 * -0.00008 *
24 0.349 *** 0.0024 *** -0.00010 *** 0.702 *** 0.0015 *** -0.00006 *** 0.298 *** 0.0025 * -0.00011 *
Peak 0.341 *** 0.0079 ** -0.00013 ** 0.794 *** 0.0012 * -0.00004 ** 0.276 *** 0.0089 ** -0.00014 **
Off-peak 0.475 *** 0.0025 ** -0.00008 ** 0.798 *** 0.0013 ** -0.00004 ** 0.429 *** 0.0027 ** -0.00008 **
Daily 0.456 *** 0.0048 *** -0.00009 ** 0.814 *** 0.0011 *** -0.00004 ** 0.404 *** 0.0054 *** -0.00010 **
Notes: Peak period: 08:00-20:00, Off-peak period: 00:00-08:00 & 20:00-24:00. T is a monthly indicator (2010m1: T=0, …, 2015m6: T=65). ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% level, respectively. 
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Table 5 shows a summary of the first stage regression results for all sample market pairs, and 
additionally distinguishes between adjacent and indirect market areas. Moreover, the table 
provides estimates for each daily hour (01:00–24:00), for averages of peak and off-peak 
periods, and for daily averages. The analysis follows Equation (1) but is extended by additional 
interaction terms with a monthly time trend (, ∗ ) and its squared term (, ∗ 2) to capture 
non-linear time effects on the cointegrating relation () between the two price series. Hence we 
can reformulate Equation (1) as: 
, =  + , + 1, ∗  + 2, ∗ 2 + ,  (8) 
where  runs from zero in the first month (2010m1) to 65 in the last month (2015m6). The 
estimates thus shed some light on the question of how market integration evolves over time. 
For the daily average over all market pairs, a cointegration coefficient of  = 0.456 means that, 
on average, all 600 market pairs tend to exhibit a co-movement of their daily spot prices of 
45.6%.17 This number seems to be quite modest and is a preliminary indication that market 
integration among European electricity markets is limited and far from full convergence.  
Yet, the 72 adjacent market pairs tend to be already well-integrated concerning their 
cointegrating relation of  = 0.814 at the daily average. Evidently, the 524 indirectly linked 
markets are, on average, only half as well cointegrated ( = 0.404) as adjacent market pairs. 
Besides, while adjacent market areas tend to be equally cointegrated in peak ( = 0.794) and 
off-peak ( = 0.798) times, indirect pairs show a higher degree of cointegration during off-
peak periods ( = 0.43) compared to peak periods ( = 0.28). Table 5 also shows that the 
cointegration coefficients vary by each daily hour indicating that markets may work better in 
some hours than in others.18
Graph 1 shows how the degree of market integration (-coefficients) change over time 
according to our estimations. We can see that integration increases until mid of 2012 but then 
decreases in subsequent years. It seems that investment in interconnector capacity and in market 
coupling have led to higher levels of integration, yet with structural changes in the electricity 
markets – foremost the increasing share of subsidized and prioritized feed-in of intermittent 
renewables – have counteracted integration in Europe in later years. 
17 Non-adjacent markets dominate the overall effects, given their relatively large number of 524 indirect pairs, 
compared to only 72 direct pairs. 
18 Note that the daily averages do not necessarily reflect the averages of the daily hours, since their moments (mean, 
variance) are different. 
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Table 6 is based on a subsample of market pairs that were subject to the establishment of market 
coupling and provides first stage regression results according to Equation (4). We are able to 
distinguish the direction of congestion in the regressions and explicitly watch their effect on the 
degree of integration with and without market coupling. While cross-border congestion in levels 
( and ) directly influences the institutional difference, , the interaction terms 
( ∗  and   ∗ ) show how the degree of integration, , changes with congestion 
in the respective direction. Evidently, before market coupling, cross-border congestion has 
ambiguous effects on  and , since available capacities may have been allocated inefficiently 
in either direction (independently of the relative prices between markets A and B). For example, 
between Germany and Italy, prior to market coupling, uncongested trade (, = 0, 
, = 0) results in  = 11.79 and  = 0.47. The two markets have a relatively high 
institutional price difference of EUR 11.79 per MWh, and their long-rung price relation of 47% 
is relatively modest. While export congestion (, = 1) lets  decrease by 3.47 to 8.32 and 
 increase by 0.04 to 0.53, import congestion (, = 1) lets  increase by 1.91 to 13.70 



































































































Graph 1. First stage results: β coefficients
all pairs adjacent pairs indirect pairs
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Table 6. 1st stage estimates before and after the introduction of market coupling
Market Before MC After MC
A B Intro. MC      ∗   ∗       ∗   ∗ 
  10.11.2011 0.64 0.89 4.68 8.46 -0.19 -0.05a 0.00a 1.00 1.61 16.70 -0.29 -0.25
  24.02.2015 11.79 0.47 -3.47 1.91 0.04 -0.04 0.00a 1.00 -1.54a 16.03 -0.37 -0.29
  05.02.2014 1.79 0.96 11.95 15.21 -0.47 -0.14 0.00a 1.00 -4.38 12.35 -0.12 -0.15
  05.02.2014 -0.08a 1.00 -7.72 20.00 -0.03 -0.25 0.00a 1.00 -1.86 13.85 -0.19 -0.19
 4 05.02.2014 2.38 0.95 5.72 24.32 -0.38 -0.34 0.00a 1.00 -6.75 12.84 -0.05 -0.16
  10.11.2011 11.18 0.85 -14.53 5.33 0.13a 0.03a 0.00a 1.00 -7.50 18.46 -0.04 -0.16
  24.02.2015 10.43 0.56 2.49 -3.32 -0.11 0.25 0.00a 1.00 1.54a 25.89 -0.36 -0.40
  13.05.2014 21.07 0.55 -18.65 12.72 0.15 -0.02 0.00a 1.00 -7.67 21.47 -0.22 -0.29
  01.01.2011 7.49 0.87 0.05 -0.55 -0.29 0.14 0.00a 1.00 -2.98 21.44 -0.31 -0.31
  24.02.2015 28.87 0.92 2.64 -0.74 -0.04 -0.08 0.00a 1.00 -9.93 32.59 -0.01a -0.46
  24.02.2015 28.84 0.74 -11.73 5.00 0.06 -0.03 0.00a 1.00 -7.21 31.87 -0.13 -0.48
  01.01.2011 0.48 1.00 -4.65 28.85 -0.08 -0.24 0.00a 1.00 -7.02 31.85 -0.11 -0.46
  05.02.2014 0.45a 0.98 1.69 11.64 -0.21 0.01a 0.00a 1.00 -0.37 20.68 -0.58 -0.58
  05.02.2014 1.84 0.96 2.95 17.53 -0.25 -0.27 0.00a 1.00 5.67 15.79 -0.39 -0.39
4  05.02.2014 1.56 0.94 6.17 19.56 -0.33 -0.14 0.00a 1.00 7.11 21.94 -0.40 -0.63
  13.05.2014 21.96 0.41 -15.42 4.45 0.11 0.21 0.00a 1.00 -7.56 32.97 -0.07 -0.42
Notes: a insignificant coefficient (below the 90% significance level). “Intro. MC” stands for the date of the introduction of market coupling.
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Besides, Table 6 shows that without market coupling the law of one price does not hold even 
when interconnection capacities were not exhausted due to misallocation of available capacity. 
In other words, in spite of controlling for cross-border congestion, adjacent market areas’ prices 
do not fully converge to perfect cointegration as  > 0 and  ≠ 1.19 After the introduction of 
market coupling, markets are indeed perfectly integrated ( = 0,  = 1), when we control for 
interconnection congestion. This may not be surprising, yet empirically proofs that no other 
drivers except for market coupling and interconnector capacities are responsible for price 
convergence. 
6.2. Second Stage: Efficiency of Market Integration 
Provided the discussion in Section 4.2., we estimate the error correction model during times of 
unequal prices (i.e. trade restrictions) at the time when the shock is measured (in t-24). From 
this, we draw inference about how effectively markets deal with shocks during times of trade 
frictions. In the following, we present estimates (i) for the unconstrained error correction model 
as in Equation (6), which shows the speed of adjustment back to the actual long-rung 
equilibrium relation between a price pair; and (ii) for the constrained model, where we impose 
perfect price relations ( = 0,  = 1) and estimate the speed of adjustment back to uniform 
prices. 
Table 7 presents a comprehensive summary of the estimated coefficients of the error correction 
terms between all adjacent market areas.20 The table only includes values for which Granger 
causality tests indicate causal relations (i.e. rejection of the H0 that PB does not Granger cause PA at the 90% level). In Column (1), the table shows ECT estimates of the unconstrained model 
(Equation (6)) back to the actual long-run equilibrium relationship (). The average estimated 
ECT across adjacent market pairs is ̅ = 0.30. However, as mentioned above, this estimate 
is not representative across markets, since -coefficients vary strongly. 
19 One exemption is DE-DKw, for which  is statistically insignificant and  equals one. 
20 The estimations exclude wind and solar forecasts due to unavailable data for most markets. However, including 
wind and solar forecast for DE, DKe, and DKw does not alter the coefficients of the ECT in the respective 
estimations. Hence, wind and solar forecasts may be of subordinate significance for our estimations. Moreover, all 
regressions include a binary indicator for market coupling (and other control variables). The estimates indeed proof 
that market coupling leads to a price increase in the initially low price market and vice versa. Results are available 
upon request. 
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Table 7. Second stage results: ECT for unconstrained and constrained models, hourly
Market ECT Obs. Market ECT Obs. A B β (1) unconst. (2) constr. PA,t-24 ≠ PB,t-24 Total % A B β (1) unconst. (2) constr. PA,t-24 ≠ PB,t-24 Total %
DE FR 0.74 -0.30 -0.18 24,541 48,137 51.0 SE3 NO1 0.94 -0.36 -0.35 20,711 48,136 43.0
DE CH 0.73 -0.37 -0.23 45,480 48,149 94.5 SE2 SE3 0.97 -0.27 -0.26 1,075 48,136 2.2
DE IT 0.49 -0.25 -0.09 45,823 48,149 95.2 SE2 NO4 1.00 -0.39 -0.39 7,992 48,136 16.6
DE DKE 0.63 -0.20 -0.10 31,218 48,114 64.9 SE1 NO4 1.00 -0.39 -0.39 7,800 48,136 16.2
DE DKW 0.89 -0.22 -0.19 28,835 48,144 59.9 PT ES 0.96 -0.23 -0.20 4,914 48,168 10.2
DE SE4 0.52 -0.22 -0.12 37,672 48,117 78.3 ES FR 0.34 -0.27 -0.15 44,543 48,154 92.5
DE CZ 0.93 -0.45 -0.35 45,266 48,149 94.0 ES PT 0.99 -0.38 -0.37 4,914 48,168 10.2
FR CH 0.88 -0.30 -0.23 45,390 48,154 94.3 NO5 NO2 1.05 -0.38 -0.37 7,856 48,168 16.3
FR IT 0.50 -0.21 -0.08 45,622 48,154 94.7 NO5 NO1 0.88 -0.04 -0.03 5,557 48,168 11.5
CH DE 0.90 -0.26 -0.22 45,504 48,149 94.5 NO3 SE2 0.98 -0.21 -0.21 6,860 48,134 14.3
CH FR 0.88 -0.29 -0.23 45,413 48,154 94.3 NO3 NO4 1.01 -0.50 -0.50 3,495 48,134 7.3
CH IT 0.53 -0.18 -0.06 45,715 48,168 94.9 NO3 NO1 0.95 -0.39 -0.37 23,165 48,134 48.1
SL DE 0.89 -0.27 -0.25 42,507 45,029 94.4 NO2 DKW 0.61 -0.02 -0.01 26,923 48,163 55.9
SL IT 0.65 -0.26 -0.16 36,426 45,048 80.9 NO2 NO5 0.93 -0.18 -0.15 7,856 48,168 16.3
HU DE 0.89 -0.40 -0.38 40,657 43,316 93.9 NO2 NO1 0.83 -0.09 -0.06 6,162 48,168 12.8
HU SK 0.92 -0.46 -0.45 23,312 39,404 59.2 NO1 SE3 0.86 -0.06 -0.04 20,745 48,136 43.1
IT DE 0.81 -0.24 -0.22 45,847 48,149 95.2 NO1 NO5 1.03 -0.25 -0.25 5,557 48,168 11.5
IT FR 0.67 -0.24 -0.21 45,646 48,154 94.8 NO1 NO3 0.89 -0.10 -0.08 23,203 48,134 48.2
IT CH 0.71 -0.25 -0.22 45,715 48,168 94.9 NO1 NO2 1.09 -0.25 -0.25 6,162 48,168 12.8
IT SL 0.73 -0.25 -0.21 36,449 45,048 80.9 FIN SE3 0.92 -0.55 -0.52 11,999 48,128 24.9
DKE SE4 0.90 -0.45 -0.42 11,917 48,133 24.8 FIN SE1 0.92 -0.56 -0.52 12,617 48,128 26.2
DKW DE 0.74 -0.25 -0.15 28,840 48,144 59.9 FIN EST 0.91 -0.16 -0.15 14,683 45,993 31.9
DKW DKE 0.68 -0.21 -0.09 13,352 48,128 27.7 LV EST 0.95 -0.37 -0.37 9,414 18,192 51.7
DKW SE3 0.59 -0.36 -0.21 22,274 48,131 46.3 EST FIN 0.56 -0.30 -0.12 14,678 45,993 31.9
DKW NO2 0.64 -0.37 -0.29 26,918 48,163 55.9 CZ DE 0.94 -0.40 -0.34 45,290 48,149 94.1
SE4 DE 0.61 -0.11 -0.07 37,638 48,117 78.2 SK CZ 1.01 -0.81 -0.81 897 39,408 2.3
SE4 SE3 0.98 -0.43 -0.43 2,286 48,136 4.7
Notes: The Table only includes values for which Granger causality tests reject the H0 that PB does not Granger cause PA at the 90% level. The constrained model imposes a uniform 
price relation (α = 0, β = 1). Estimates of β>1 are statistically not different from 1. "Obs." is the number of hours for which PA,t-24 ≠ PB,t-24. All ECT coefficients are significant at the 
99% level. Robust standard errors are applied. All regressions include the following control variables: 24h lag of the dependent variable, dummy for market coupling, price of gas, 
fixed effects for holidays, days and months.
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Column (2) of Table 7 gives estimates of the constrained model (Equation (7)) back to uniform 
prices (i.e.  = 0,  = 1). In this specification, we can directly compare the estimated 
coefficients of the ECT across market pairs in order to evaluate their efficiency to deal with 
systemic shocks. The number of observations is low for some market pairs indicating that price 
differences are hardly observed and that most of the times market integration is perfectly 
efficient already. The average speed of adjustment back to uniform prices is ̅ = 0.25
indicating that 25% of a price shock within 24 hours. This number is somewhat lower than what 
the unconstrained model would predict. 
Form Table 7, the ECT coefficient estimates from the unrestricted model suggest that some 
market areas work well in terms of high speeds of adjustment (i.e. high negative ECT 
coefficients), yet their long-rung price relations may be far from perfect ( deviates from unity). 
For example, the market pair DE-FR exhibits a speed of adjustment of  = 0.30, yet  =0.74. This means that 30% of a price shock are absorbed within 24 hours back to an equilibrium 
level of integration of 74%. The ECT coefficient from the restricted model, however, is only 
 = 0.18, indicating that 18% of a price shock are absorbed within 24 hours back to uniform 
prices. It takes longer to converge to perfect integration. 
Also, Table 7 shows that some market pairs work more efficiently in one direction than in the 
other. While, for example, the constrained model delivers a parameter estimate of  = 0.09
for DE-IT, it yields  = 0.22 for IT-DE. Provided that Italy is relatively shut-off from its 
neighbors, we can see that the markets work more efficiently from Germany to Italy than in the 
other direction. 
Finally, we discuss the lag structure of the error correction model. Compared to many other 
studies, which employ daily averages in their analyses, our data are at the hourly frequency. 
This allows for the additional inclusion of a one-hour lag in the error correction model to capture 
intra-day demand and supply frictions. For example, the demand in a particular hour may 
depend on the daylight, and thus hinge upon the previous hour. Conventional power plants, 
which cannot adjust their electricity production (i.e. “ramping”) according to each hour’s 
demand may represent an example for an intra-day supply rigidity.  
For this purpose, Graph 2 presents ECT coefficient estimates from the constrained model 
(Equation (7)) for Germany and its neighboring markets both with and without including a one-
hour autoregressive term. Evidently, the magnitudes of the ECT coefficients are larger when 
the model does not control for the intra-day lag. Intuitively, without changes of demand and 
supply in the previous hour, the model indicates any price adjustments as error corrections 
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(captured by ). The inclusion of the intra-day lag leads to a drop in the estimates of the ECT, 
on average, since the model only captures ceteris paribus price adjustments that are not 
explained by daily or intra-day supply and demand changes. Moreover, Graph 2 shows that for 
most of the time, markets exhibit a higher degree of efficiency when Germany represents the 
exogenous market (DE on the right-hand side).  
In summary, once we control for intra-day demand and supply changes, markets’ efficiency to 
absorb price shocks seems to be limited and drops well below the 20% level during most hours 
of the day. This is an indication that the efficiency of market integration in Central Europe is 
quite moderate. The application of the error correction model, thus, may signpost that additional 
investment in interconnector capacity and the establishment of market coupling may be 
necessary in order to enhance the performance of market integration. Especially for regions 
with low performance, investment in additional interconnector capacity and the establishment 
of market coupling (if not already implemented) may bring about great welfare improvements. 
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Graph 2. Second stage results: ECT from constrained model, DE and neighboring markets, hourly 
Notes: Estimates for ECT are based on the constrained model as in Equation (7). Black lines: DE on the right-hand side; Gray lines: DE on left-hand side; 
Solid lines: excluding intra-day lag (t-1); Dashed lines: including intra-day lag (t-1).
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7. Conclusions 
In this study, we empirically investigate the current state of the integration of day-ahead 
electricity spot markets in Europe. We argue that market integration may be desirable from a 
welfare perspective (through allocative efficiency) and thus represents a normative benchmark 
for policy making. Moreover, recent developments call for better market integration for the 
purposes of balancing and supply security. For example, the increasing production from 
intermittent renewables puts pressure on the grid and increases interconnector congestion 
(Baritaund & Volk, 2014). Moreover, an increasing share of prosumers tend to feed electricity 
into the grid (from the downstream end) at times of low demand, which also destabilizes the 
grid. 
To obtain these benefits, enhanced market integration necessitates the availability of physical 
transport facilities (reduction of intra-market bottlenecks in the grid and the extension of 
interconnection capacity between adjacent markets) as well as the establishment of market 
coupling in order to efficiently allocate capacities. Each of these prerequisites is directly linked 
to enormous investments that are sunk. Besides the enormous investment costs, welfare 
redistribution may place an obstacle on the political realization of a single European electricity 
market, since we argue that market integration also creates winners and losers. This is why 
market integration up to some degree may be desirable, in order to attain a great deal of its 
associated positive effects, yet avoid the enormous investment costs of inducing perfect market 
integration. 
The econometric approach of this paper goes beyond the scope of other related empirical 
literatures on this topic. First, we collected data on a rich sample of prices from 25 European 
electricity spot markets for the hourly period from January 1, 2010 to June 30, 2015. Second, 
we extend this dataset by interconnection congestion, its direction, and market coupling, in 
order to control for trade frictions. Third, we posit that the estimation of an error correction 
model may be inadequate during times of uncongested trade (i.e. uniform prices), when markets 
are already fully efficient, so that no shocks resulting in differential prices can be observed. We 
therefore restrict our estimations to times of trade frictions (i.e. interconnection congestion 
and/or absence of market coupling) to infer about how efficiently markets deal with price 
shocks when the system does not work fully efficient. Fourth, we stress that estimates of the 
error correction model should be constrained to a perfect cointegrating relation in order to make 
statements about markets’ speeds of adjustment after shocks back to uniform prices. Fifth, we 
provide evidence that the inclusion of intra-day price lags is important in order to control for 
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demand and supply rigidities. When doing so, there is indication that European markets still 
seem to have rather low efficiency in absorbing price shocks. 
In a first step, we provide empirical evidence from cointegration analysis that market integration 
among European electricity markets increased in the beginning of the sample period, but has 
been declining since about the second quarter of 2012. This result may be largely driven by the 
increased electricity production from subsidized intermittent renewables. Hence, market 
integration represents a desirable policy instrument for markets with increasing shares of 
renewable electricity generation in order to balance volatility and secure network stability 
through trade. While adjacent market pairs seem to be well cointegrated ( = 0.81) already, 
indirect pairs’ cointegration tends to be only half as high ( = 0.40). In sum, the level of 
integration among European electricity markets is still modest, and for some regions very low. 
In addition, we empirically show that interconnector capacity and market coupling are the sole 
drivers of price convergence – in the presence of market coupling and uncongested 
interconnectors, markets have uniform prices.   
In a second step, the empirical results from an error correction model indicate that adjacent 
markets have limited efficiency to deal with price shocks conditional on observed trade frictions 
(i.e. price differences). On average, European market pairs have a speed of adjustment of, on 
average,  = 0.25 indicating that 25% of a shock are absorbed within one day back to uniform 
prices. Moreover, at the hourly frequency, we are able to include a one-hour autoregressive lag 
(which cannot be done at the daily frequency), which accounts for intra-day demand and supply 
rigidities. Doing so, the estimated parameters of the error correction terms between Germany 
and its neighboring markets drop well below the 20%-level for most of the hours. This is a 
strong indication that the state of market integration is still quite limited, raising the potential 
for further welfare improvements from additional capacity investments and the establishment 
of market coupling. Especially markets with low initial levels of available interconnection 
capacity may experience substantial benefits from investment in market integration. 
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